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INSTITUTE

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**EUROPE IN THE WORLD:
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT**

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Summary

This GGI ‘Views from Practice’ Paper by Belgian’s Deputy Prime Minister and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Steven Vanackere, provides a comprehensive and frank analysis of five major challenges (organizing the new global governance, improving relations with Europe’s changing neighbourhood, engaging with strategic partners, responding to conflicts and humanitarian crises as well as climate change and resource security); five major foreign policy innovations; and five major options for improvements related to the European Union as a credible and effective actor in a substantially changing Global Governance landscape. The paper addresses the main power shifts as a result of the financial crisis and takes stock of the main foreign policy innovations of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty. In the final section of the paper, Vanackere calls for the following main improvements:

- A permanent EU Military Headquarters for the conduct of EU Civilian/Military Operations
- Abolishing the ‘unanimity rule’ in decision-making procedures related to CFSP and EU Foreign Policy matters
- More permanent forms of EU Representation in the G20, World Bank and IMF (including a permanent representation of the Eurozone in these institutions)
- Strengthening of the European External Action Service (including shared analysis of events and crises as well as ‘smarter’ and more rational cooperation between the 27 diplomatic national services)

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About the Author

Mr Steven Vanackere is currently Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance and Sustainable Development of the Kingdom of Belgium. Before his appointment in December 2011 in the new Government, he served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Institutional Reform since November 2009. From December 2008 to November 2009, he was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Civil Service, Public Enterprises and Institutional Reform. Mr Vanackere was also Flemish Minister of Welfare, Public Health and the Family from June 2007 to December 2008 and served as Member of the Flemish Parliament from 2004 to 2007.

Born in 1964 in Wevelgem, Belgium, Mr Vanackere holds a Degree in Political Science and Master’s degrees in Economics and Law from K.U. Leuven.

Europe in the world: Challenges & Opportunities

The role of “Europe in the world: core challenges and possible solutions” is a fundamental issue that has been addressed innumerable times in this city or elsewhere in the world in the past decades. But it remains very valid and relevant in the minds of Europeans and many people in the world, *and not just for the EU-watchers at the Schuman Roundabout*. Following the developments around the Mediterranean or in the Middle East, people ask: where is Europe? When new and fragile democracies at the eastern side of our continent struggle to get rid of the demons of the past and try to find their place in the new order of nations, they ask whether Europe can help. Confronted with the fall out of the largest economic and financial crisis since the Second World War, and in the face of the rising economic powers of the emerging economies, people are looking for a more pronounced role of the European Union in the global economic governance.

Almost 2 years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, I would like to deliver some personal remarks on the global challenges for the EU and possible solutions. These are based on my observations as Minister of Foreign Affairs and on my work in the foreign policy institutions of the European Union, including some of the work carried out by me during the Belgian EU Presidency. I shall also try to highlight a number of areas where the EU would have to organize itself better in order to have more impact on the world scene.

Let me first summarize some of the major challenges the EU is confronted with. One can always discuss when making lists, but I think **I can distinguish 5 situations or phenomena that we usually call ‘challenges’, i.e. issues that present dangers of threats to the EU but that also offer opportunities to strengthen European action abroad.**

1. Organizing the New Global Governance

Over the years we got used to live with the international system as epitomized by the United Nations or the Bretton Woods institutions that were created after the Second World War. However, the fast rise of the emerging powers in the past decade, together with the financial and economic crisis has clearly altered the balance of power in the world and has created an ever stronger economic and monetary interdependence. Heavily indebted Western nations, some of them with a huge trade deficit, are struggling to find the right answers to the economic crisis. Although the emerging countries depend on prosperous export markets, they seem to be relatively unaffected by the crisis, thanks to steadfast domestic demand.

The effects of this situation are now being felt in global economic governance. In 2008 the G20 convened for the first time at the level of heads of state or government and has proclaimed itself in 2009 as the “premier forum for international economic coordination” of its members. The governing structures of the IMF and the World Bank are in a process of overhaul, in order to better take into account the increased economic weight of the BRICS. I tell you no secret by saying that this move will not leave the position of Belgium (and that of other Western European mid-sized countries) untouched. Here the globalization and the changing centres of gravity are clearly perceptible. The EU cannot stay idle and wait for things to happen. The pressure is mounting for the Eurozone to get its act together and to reorganize e.g. its external representation in the international financial institutions. We are not there yet, by far, but more and more policy makers are convinced that the EU and the Eurozone in particular need appropriate means to be heard in the world. More in general, an enhanced European economic governance is a condition for exerting more influence on the world stage, because external EU policy implies more unity in internal policy choices (e.g. energy, resources) - and vice versa.

2. Improving relations with our Changing Neighbourhood

Stabilizing and developing relations with our neighbourhood, both east and south. As the centre of gravity of the world is shifting to the east, Europe has to take increased responsibilities in order to accompany the transitions on its southern and eastern flanks and to ensure stability and prosperity around its borders (related to a new attitude in the US – deliberate choice of refusing, at least in public, American actions at the forefront in Libya). In the East the EU is gradually redefining its relations with nations that up till the end of the cold war lived under the communist rule. In October 2011 in Warsaw, the Eastern Partnership summit took place, one of the most important meetings during the Polish EU-presidency. The preparatory discussions of the conclusions have sharply focused our debates on how the EU wants to define its relation with these neighbours: according to Belgian views, we want to invest heavily in the broad development of relations in all walks of life, because this partnership is “based on a community of values and principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.” At the same time, however, we Belgians are convinced that this process of ‘rapprochement’ does not automatically give an entry pass as a new member of the EU: that is another discussion, with the appropriate procedures and finalities.

At our southern border, we have witnessed the ‘Arab awakening’ since the beginning of 2011, for sure a turning point in the recent history of the Arab nations in the Mediterranean area (I prefer ‘awakening’ to ‘spring’ as, the latter has a connotation of something passively coming and disappearing, while the former alludes to a real new and active beginning). The EU cannot stay aloof to the massive expressions of hope and change at its southern borders. Who could have thought, one year ago, that after decades of stagnation, a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity would be created for both sides to begin a new and intense

relationship based on shared values of democracy, the rule of law and the adherence to universal human rights? We shall now have to find answers to difficult challenges related to trade, to immigration and to the stabilization of hesitating and fragile democratic processes.

Taking care of its own neighbourhood and thereby stabilizing potential areas of unrest or internal stabilization in the EU is a daunting task for the EU, but therefore not less urgent or desirable... Let me add to this here that this task is not only about money: it is as much, if not more, about improving governance and about the respect (or acceptance) of the rule of law. In this context I also like to point out that there exists already an extensive network of trade relations with these countries, often based on bilateral agreements: we have now more than ever the task to exploit their potential to the fullest, something which obviously has not been done sufficiently up till now.

3. Engaging with Strategic Partners

Then there is the circle of our main partners in the world, our “strategic partnerships”: with the US, Russia, India, Brazil, China, Japan to name but a few. This challenge is not easy either: Herman Van Rompuy pointed out already in 2010 that the EU now has its strategic partners, but the next thing was to find a strategy... Our relations with these important partners offer certainly tremendous opportunities for increased cooperation in trade, science, climate change, anti-terrorism, diplomatic cooperation etc... but by their sheer size and clout, these partners can also be considered as ‘challenges’ to the EU, as their national interests do not always coincide with ours. Therefore, in the past 2 years, the President of the European Council and the High Representative Catherine Ashton undertook special efforts to reflect on how to improve the EU’s approach towards these partners. In September 2010, the European Council decided that the “EU will act more strategically, so as to bring Europe’s true

weight to bear internationally. This requires a clear identification of its strategic interests and objectives at a given moment and a focused reflection on the means to pursue them more assertively.”

Almost every day now, we - Belgium, the EU - are confronted with questions related to the choices of our new strategic partners: when the UN Security Council could not find an agreement on a new resolution on Syria, we wondered why its temporary members such as India, South-Africa or Brazil did not support a moderate text that appealed to the Syrian regime to cease brutalities against its own population? How do these BRICS-countries deal with important questions of responsibility in and for world affairs? As I have stressed in my speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2011: *non-interference should be replaced by non-indifference*.

Another example of the kind of matters that we discuss with our strategic partners is on the fate of the Doha Development Round of the WTO. Shall we work together for a fair and balanced deal to the benefit of all trading nations, rich and poor? There is at least on the European side a strong desire, but it must be said that the prospect for a deal is nowhere in sight, despite tremendous efforts of the EU in these negotiations.

I want to mention here a challenge which is a traditional European concern – and of Belgium as well: our relations with Africa. You will be surprised, but measured against my definition of strategic partners – nations that by their choices, actions or situations have an immediate impact on our daily lives – Africa is of course of strategic importance to us, even if it does not match the traditional view of emerging powers with double digit growth rates. Young nations are slowly finding their way in economic development and more stable and democratic policies. The EU is developing strategies for the Sahel, the Great Lakes area, Northern Africa and has been substantially increasing its cooperation with the African union.

4. Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises

Without wanting to make a world tour, I cannot but think of a few areas of intense or simmering conflict, nearby such as in the Caucasus or in the Balkan, or further away in the Horn of Africa or in Afghanistan: here, the EU is committed to be part of the solution and here the Member states have invested alone or under the guidance of the UN and the EU human and financial capital, very often also military means (operation Atalanta against piracy off the coast of Somalia), in order to defend human rights standards, show solidarity, to protect our trade interests or to stabilize our borders. Conflicts not only cause a security challenge, but also give rise to humanitarian disasters and make people move around in neighbouring countries. Conflicts cause very complex clusters of problems / challenges, but the EU is increasingly well ‘armed’ with a diversified range of instruments of civilian, humanitarian or military nature, to tackle them. I shall come back to this point below when discussing the ‘potential solutions’.

5. Climate Change & Resource Governance

Finally, managing climate change, keeping access to natural resources and safeguarding food security are three closely related challenges of a rather horizontal nature where the EU is playing a major role. Some simple numbers are telling a sobering truth: the total world population will rise to 8 billion people by 2025; but the alimentary requirements will increase at a much higher pace, with 50% by 2030. It is also estimated that 36 countries affecting 1,4 billion people will have shortages of fresh drinking water in 2025. Building for instance on an ambitious climate package, adopted in 2008 and transformed into law soon after, the EU has been a very active player in the international negotiations of the UN Framework Convention against Climate Change (UNFCCC) and in the discussions on the follow up regime of the Kyoto protocol. The negotiations at Durban proved to be

encouraging and we all hope that the memories of that awful negotiation in Copenhagen, where the EU was side-lined, will fade away.

These three issues are also related in some way to a fourth important horizontal challenge: how to deal with migration, caused by conflict, drought, changing climate, insufficient food provision or a lack of resources in general to develop a prosperous and functioning society?

In all of these challenges you will remark that the development of an international action by the EU was driven by internal policies or motives. In order to offer safety to our citizens, to provide them with export markets and trade opportunities, to mitigate the effects of climate change or migrations that are caused outside our borders, or to assist neighbouring countries in transition to stabilize their societies and create human security for the local populations at local level: these are the internal motives that drive the EU in its action abroad. These motives were largely absent in the first years of the European Communities but over the years, the development of internal policies has taken such a proportion that these policies lose their purpose if they are not accompanied by corresponding external actions.

However, internal policy motivations are not alone in explaining the external action of the EU. Even before the EU developed into a major actor in internal policy areas (research, migration, energy and climate or internal market policies) in the past 2 decades, other, more voluntary and 'noble' motives for the development of an external action of the EU had always been a prominent 'driver' of external action, such as the defence of our core values in the world: in a globalizing world with instant information on crisis situations abroad, the public awareness of what is right or wrong has increased dramatically. Very often I feel cynicism in the reaction of many citizens: world politics would always involve the pursuit of oil or

other interests; but I can assure you that this is by no means correct. We all remember the reactions of the Belgian parliamentarians in March 2011 to the dramatic siege of Benghazi by the Kaddafi regime and their overwhelming support for the military intervention by the Belgian government.

The EU offers the right scale of operation in a globalized world...

The EU seems to offer the right scale of operation in our complex and globalised world. The years of Small is beautiful have been forgotten for long.... Now the trend is to say that size matters. Nations states remain at the heart of international politics and diplomacy: as the former Belgian foreign minister and current Finance Minister I am the last in this hall to deny this. But most policy makers have now understood that the national level has its limits. Many years ago Paul-Henri Spaak used to say that "*There are only two types of States in Europe: small States, and small States that have not yet realised that they are small.*" That period seems now to firmly behind us, but in times of crisis we have sometimes to be reminded of this truism: for instance, last July, Wolfgang Schäuble, the finance minister of the biggest member state of the EU, the Federal Republic of Germany, referred to this issue when defending before the constitutional court in Karlsruhe the German government's decisions in the case of the European support actions for Greece: "Every single European country, also the German Federal Republic – we are all too small to assume our interests and responsibilities in a globalized world".

My experience as Foreign Minister has convinced me more than ever that no country, as big or important as it might be, is capable of tackling global challenges alone. And no country, how modest-sized it might be, should think that it cannot be part of the solution.

Tremendous progress was made in the development of policy instruments for the

conduct of our external relations. Most recently the Treaty of Lisbon enlarged our toolbox considerably.

The entry into force of this Treaty concluded a period of about 9 years of intense negotiations and public discussions, producing eventually a new Treaty amending the 2 basic treaties of the EU, the Treaty of Rome (on the European Communities) and the Treaty of Maastricht (on the European Union). The principal task that was given to the drafters of the new treaty was to adapt the European decision making procedures to the new realities of an enlarged EU. But another objective was looming behind these discussions in the first decade of the 21st century: how could the Member States of the EU improve its influence in world affairs? How could the EU be better heard, how could our views be brought forward with more forceful conviction and unified negotiating positions? Those were precisely the questions the new Treaty sought to answer as well.

The European External Action Service and strengthened Foreign Policy under the Lisbon Treaty

Let us recall rapidly 5 major innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the conduct of external relations of the EU:

1. The High Representative

The creation of the function of the High Representative for foreign affairs and security Policy, to give more visibility and stability in the external representation of the EU in CFSP-matters and to give more consistency between the different sectors of EU action (trade, development cooperation, justice and home affairs and CFSP). We used to say she is double-hatted but in reality she wears 3 hats: vice-president of the Commission and High representative for CFSP, but also: president of the Foreign Affairs Council. The task looks (and is) daunting, but the fathers of the Lisbon Treaty thought that this accumulation of functions

would be well suited for creating better synergies. At the level of the heads of state or government, the treaty now provides that the EU's external representation is shared between the president of the European Council, now Herman Van Rompuy, and the President of the Commission, J.M. Barroso.

2. The European External Action Service

The proposal of the High Representative (HR) on the organization and the functioning of the EEAS was adopted in July 2010. With the nomination of the top levels of management shortly thereafter, the new service officially started operations as from December 1, 2010. During its Council presidency in 2010, Belgium played an important role in the setting up of this new sui generis institution. As you know, it incorporates most of the sections of the Commission and the Council secretariat dealing with external relations and as a rule of thumb 1/3 of its staff should be seconded from the Member States. Apart from a headquarter staff in Brussels, it also provides a network of about 130 EU delegations in third countries or with international organizations.

3. Strengthening of the Common foreign and Security Policy (CSFP)

The treaty has improved the leadership at the top (creation of the HR); given legal personality to the EU, so that the EU is clearly entitled to conclude international agreements; the procedure for concluding international agreements has been clarified (art. 218, TFEU) and slight increments were accepted as regards the very limited use of qualified majority voting. Unanimity decisions remain the rule, though.

4. The Common Security and defence Policy (CSDP)

Some significant improvements were made in this area: for the sake of brevity, I just mention the creation of the possibility for a limited number of member states to

undertake a CSDP-mission (gives more flexibility); to engage in “permanent structured co-operation” (depending on certain criteria of ‘admission’); the drafting of a new mutual assistance and solidarity clause or the creation of a European Defence Agency (it was actually the consolidation of an already existing structure).

5. Further Innovations

Finally, just one word on some important innovations in other areas of external affairs, especially trade policy matters. Important innovations are the inclusion of services and foreign direct investment as a new exclusive competence of the Union and the enhancement of the position of the European Parliament in the conclusion of international trade agreements: it must now give its consent when the area covered by the agreement touches on matters which are internally in the EU decided with co-decision.

Strengthening the EU in the World: Options for Improvement

Important steps have been taken to strengthen Europe’s role in the world. But this is not enough. The world is not waiting for us and the pace of change is sometimes stunning. The EU is still perceived by its partners as not living up to its potential. As our difficult internal discussions on how to react with unity (of view) to the Middle East Peace Process show, the EU continues to struggle to find an adequate role in events that unfold at its back door.

Looking back at almost two years of participation in the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU, I see the following areas for improvement or further development: **Five areas where we can do better and should do more:**

1. Develop further and explain better the unique policy mix which the EU as a sui generis world actor can offer

both in solving conflicts and in developing bilateral relations with third countries (e.g. through association agreements). No other international organization (if the EU can still be labelled as such) can provide similar comprehensive action in the form of civil/military operations, development cooperation, people-to-people activities and trade. This offers a real added value and should be better acknowledged in the world. The European answer to the Arab awakening was the perfect occasion to renew and rethink Europe’s approach on neighbourhood policy. For the first time it is clearly stated that the more a partner country can do in terms of reform, be it economic, social or political, the more engagingly the EU will be able to come forward. We call that principle now “more for more” or: “less for less”...

2. Improve our main new diplomatic tool, the European External Action Service

In March 2011, the Benelux countries wrote a well-received paper on how the day-to-day cooperation between the EEAS and the Member states should be improved. Among other things we propose to increase and stimulate the shared analysis of events because it leads to more common conclusions and actions. Eventually this will help the EU and its member states to speak with one voice, or at least to convey the same messages.

Together with the Baltic states, the Benelux countries agreed to examine how the EEAS could develop action in the consular field. The creation of the EEAS with more than 130 delegations abroad, combined with the legal basis in the Treaties on European citizenship, offers a real chance to improve the consular service we can give to European citizens travelling or residing in third countries. Especially in situations of disaster relief or coordination in case of natural disasters, much more cooperation could and should be possible. Belgium worked hard on this issue during its EU-presidency, with the dramatic experience of the earthquake in Haiti in mind. We also have to learn urgently

to do more with the existing resources, that are duplicated 27-fold times: e.g. our 27 EU foreign ministries employed 94.000 staff in 2010, spread over about 3150 embassies or missions or consulates worldwide... It is becoming more and more difficult to explain to our public opinion why a smart and rational cooperation between our member state diplomatic services is not advancing more.

3. A More ambitious European Representation in other International Organizations

I mentioned already how quickly and profoundly the emerging economies are overtaking the traditional global economic powers. This will be felt very soon in the fora where the principal lines of economic policy are developed. The same is true for the UN or the OSCE (Vienna). We should give more attention to the question on how the EU or, when appropriate, the Eurozone can be best represented at these tables. Notwithstanding the responsibilities of the president of the European Council and of the Commission, as described in the Treaties, should the rotating presidency keep a foothold (at the lower levels) at any price? Or should we rather choose for a more permanent and resourceful role for the European Commission?

The debate is open, but I think we should move now to more permanent forms of representation, e.g. at the G20, or in the IMF and the World Bank. For these last institutions the discussion of a common Eurozone seat should not be a taboo anymore. Maybe the on-going discussion on the reform of the governance of the Eurozone may offer a chance to address this issue. Belgium has always been of the opinion that this question should also address the external representation of the Eurozone.

As to the United Nations, the EU managed only with great efforts to enhance its observer status after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Up till today, internal discussions are on-going on how best to

organize the representation of the EU in New York or Geneva and on the precise role of the newly created delegations of the EU.

4. Provide enough financial means for our common external policies

The negotiation of the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the period 2014-2020 has started some months ago. It is per se a very difficult debate, with a good portion of populism always looming behind the corner, especially in times of economic crisis and austerity debates in the Member States. In my view, we have here an “austerity paradox”: in spending money efficiently at EU level, we can realize savings at national level in avoiding duplication or increasing the added value of collective action. In the current 7 year period (2007-2013), not more than 6,2% of the EU budget or approximately 58 billion Euros are spent on the external action of the EU. The Commission has proposed to raise this amount for the next period to 70 billion Euros, while providing some other resources for unforeseen events outside the framework. It is now up to the Member states and the European Parliament to agree on the structure and the amounts of the next MFF. Hearing me, you will not be surprised that Belgium will do all it can to preserve the already limited budget for external action.

5. The further development of a more coherent, efficient and credible security and defence architecture for the EU

I said earlier how the Treaty of Lisbon created several new possibilities for improved action in this area. But it has to be applied! Last year during our EU-presidency the 27 ministers of defence met at an informal meeting in Gent and launched a policy debate on the concept of “pooling and sharing”, i.e. developing together new military capabilities in order to increase interoperability and save money. Several member states have begun to apply this principle among them: the naval forces of Belgium and the Netherlands have developed

a very close cooperation; we have developed a common training structure for our jet fighter pilots with France; the United Kingdom and France concluded last year a far reaching defence cooperation agreement and so on. **What is lacking, though, is a Europe-wide pattern of cooperation and also the development of a common and permanent capability to prepare and conduct military operations. This is the nowadays much discussed question of the creation of a permanent operational headquarter. Belgium is very much in favour of such a structure, wherever it would be located, mainly for practical, efficiency- and cost-effective reasons.**

What way forward for the European Union?

I have briefly sketched the main challenges the EU is confronted with nowadays and I have listed some of the new tools of the EU and also a number of issues, which can be considered as unfinished business. The picture is mixed, I would say, even though the overall progress has been impressive. The easiest work has been done. The next steps will without doubt infringe more than before on national prerogatives and traditional sovereign functions or “old habits” of a nation state. As political leaders we have to make a sound judgment: where are our priorities and how can we do the best for the security and wellbeing of our citizens? Although nation states continue to have important duties to fulfil, the response to the biggest challenges that we all face as individual member states is not on the national level anymore. That conclusion is crystal clear for the Belgian politicians. I dare to go further: we feel, and I may speak as one of the representatives of that group of political leaders, supported in this course of action by a large majority of our population. The situation may be considered differently in other countries of the EU. But you, young citizens, you too will have to reflect on how

to face the core challenges of these times and on how to tackle them in the most efficient way. A collective effort such as we have endeavoured at EU-level, takes time and requires sacrifices: revisiting long cherished traditions or taking better into account the interests and different sensibilities of fellow European citizens within the enlarged Union. We shall all have to consider giving up something of our own individual sovereignty, with the firm hope of receiving in return a collective sovereignty at a higher level.

The need to move beyond the ‘unanimity rule’ in CFSP decision-making

To provoke our ensuing debate, I will finish with a short reflection on the sense of clinging to the principle of unanimity decisions in the CFSP. I have no knowledge of a functioning democratic structure in the world, where all decisions on external policy are always taken in full consensus. In all democracies, even the biggest and the oldest ones, the executive power must count on a majority in parliament. Bipartisan or unanimous support is sometimes desirable, but not necessary. A democratic majority is sufficient to support a policy. In the EU we firmly keep to unanimity decisions in matters of CFSP. That is not the case in other policy areas of the EU, where qualified majority voting (QMV) has become the norm since the Treaty of Lisbon. But the boundary of what is accepted to be decided by QMV is still moving. At the end of September 2011, the European Parliament adopted the so-called ‘Sixpack’ on the strengthening of our economic governance; in so doing, the gradual introduction of QMV in sensitive budgetary matters has been accepted, admittedly out of necessity in the face of the economic and financial crisis. Shall we have to live forever with the ineffective unanimity procedures in CFSP? The answer to that lies in your hands and in the support for this or that direction that you will show to your politicians!

About the Global Governance Institute

The Global Governance Institute (GGI) is an independent, non-profit think tank based in Brussels. GGI brings together policy-makers, scholars and practitioners from the world's leading institutions in order to devise, strengthen and improve forward-looking approaches to global governance.

Our core research areas are:

- Peace & Security
- Global Justice (including International Law & Human Rights)
- Environment & Sustainable Development
- Economic Policy
- Forward Studies & Innovation

Our Mission

Our mission is to promote comprehensive research, cutting-edge analysis and innovative advice on core policy issues, informed by a truly global perspective. This also includes raising awareness about major challenges of global governance among the general public.

Our Vision

Our vision is a more equitable, peaceful and sustainable global order based on effective but accountable international organizations, the global rule of law and the empowerment of the individual across borders and cultures. GGI places particular emphasis on the improvement of the United Nations system and its mutual reinforcement with strong regional organizations.

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